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The literature on the American jury1 too rarely considers the experience 
of other countries. This Article describes how the now over 200-year debate 
in the United States over the proper role and form of American jury practice 
suffers from the usually unstated, but typically unquestioned, premise of 
American exceptionalism,2 and suggests that American jury practice could 
benefit from considering what other systems may have to offer.3 
Scholars have paid much time and attention in recent years to jury 
reform in the United States.4 Two prominent topics in this conversation, 
both of which form the heart of this Article, have been (1) the 
appropriateness of allowing jurors to ask written questions of witnesses or 
otherwise become more informed decision makers,5 and (2) the proper 
approach to jury selection.6 The discussion of these topics, however, has 
                                                                                                             
 1. There are other jury systems in the Americas. This Article uses the 
terminology of “the American jury” as a reference specifically to juries in the 
United States of America. 
 2. See generally Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and 
Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277 (2002) (discussing the cultural 
origins of American civil procedure). 
 3. See generally Valerie P. Hans, Jury Systems Around the World, 4 ANN. 
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 275, 277 (2008) (“Comparative work on world jury systems 
and other lay participation systems, although still at an early stage, holds 
significant promise. Such research can address longstanding questions about the 
impact of lay legal participation on democracy, legal consciousness, and the 
unique perspectives and contributions that lay citizens bring to legal decision 
making. As a scientific matter, many of these questions are difficult to answer 
when one is limited to studying an existing jury system with long-settled trial 
practices and stable public and elite attitudes toward jury trial. The cross-country 
comparisons allow us to take advantage of existing variation in different 
countries, akin to a natural experiment . . . .” (citation omitted)).  
 4. See, e.g., GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. 
WATERS, THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A 
COMPENDIUM REPORT (2007), available at http://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/~/media 
/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS/SOSCompendiumFinal.ashx. 
 5. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Discussions During Civil 
Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter 
Juror Discussions During Civil Trials] (reporting on and evaluating the Arizona 
experiment with juror questions and allowing jurors to discuss the case pre-
deliberation); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in 
Trials Through Note Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256 (1996) 
[hereinafter Increasing Juror Participation] (advocating for allowing jurors to ask 
questions); Kara Lundy, Note, Juror Questioning of Witnesses: Questioning the 
United States Criminal Justice System, 85 MINN. L. REV. 2007 (2001) (advocating 
against allowing juror questions in criminal trials). 
 6. See, e.g., Roger Allan Ford, Modeling the Effects of Peremptory 
Challenges on Jury Selection and Jury Verdicts, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 377 
(2010); Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure for 
the Selection of Impartial Juries, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (1991); Hilary Weddell, 




primarily taken place on a theoretical plane. The only concrete data comes 
from the limited instances where judges have allowed experimentation in 
their courtrooms. This experimentation, unfortunately, has been infrequent 
and narrow in scope. Regarding jury selection, for example, although 
practice varies in America about whether judges, advocates, or both 
question the jury7 and for how long,8 all courts allow jury questioning—
referred to as voir dire—on average for two hours.9 During trial, however, 
no American courts allow jurors to directly question witnesses orally, and 
only 14% of state criminal trials allow juror-written questions to 
witnesses.10 Less than 1% of state courts allow jurors to discuss the 
evidence before deliberations commence in criminal trials.11 Ultimately, 
the United States has limited data to evaluate the effectiveness of jury 
questioning, no examples of trials with active oral questioning by jurors, 
and very limited data on jury deliberation during trial. 
Although such information is lacking in America, other countries have 
conducted these evaluations of their jury systems.12 Some of these systems 
are British-based, meaning they have an adversarial system, common law 
rules of evidence, and a law/fact division of responsibilities between judge 
and jury.13 Within the British-derived systems, American jury reformists 
should be particularly interested in systems of roughly the same vintage as 
the United States. The British system itself has evolved and changed over 
many centuries.14 Each British-derived system is born out of the version of 
British justice as it existed at the pertinent moment. Although comparative 
law cannot control for all differences between nations,15 nations are of the 
                                                                                                             
Note, A Jury of Whose Peers?: Eliminating Racial Discrimination in Jury 
Selection Procedures, 33 B.C. J. LAW & SOC. JUST. 453 (2013). 
 7. MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 27–28. 
 8. See id. at 77–78. 
 9. See id.  
 10. See id. at 32 tbl.24, 34–35. 
 11. See id. at 32 tbl.24. 
 12. See Hans, supra note 3, at 276. For a summary of jury systems in place 
in Europe see John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, Lay Adjudication and 
Human Rights in Europe, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 83, 93–100 (2007). 
 13. See generally Hans, supra note 3, at 278–79 (“Juries are usually 
embedded within an adversarial common law system in which oral testimony by 
witnesses is the predominant method of evidence presentation, a sharp contrast 
with the civil law tradition of document-based litigation. The adversarial approach 
favors passive decision makers, whereas the inquisitorial approach promotes the 
active involvement of decision makers in the development of evidence.” (citations 
omitted)); accord Jackson & Kovalev, supra note 12, at 95–96.  
 14. For a detailed history of the British jury system, see Douglas G. Smith, 
The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
377, 390–420 (1996). 
 15. Some of the Author’s colleagues are concerned with the contemporary 
use of the word “nation,” noting that we can no longer equate “nation” with “state” 




greatest utility when they are most similar.16 These nations can serve as 
useful illustrations of the possible outcomes of American jury reforms.17 
Within the British-derived court systems, one nation of very similar 
vintage to the United States is Malta, a member of the European Union and 
Commonwealth of Nations.18 Malta is a small island nation in the 
Mediterranean Sea,19 which from 1798 to 1964 was part of the British 
Empire.20 Perhaps surprisingly, Malta and the United States—at least from 
the perspective of their jury practices—are essentially twins separated at 
birth. The American jury system is a direct descendant of the eighteenth 
century British system,21 whereas the Maltese system is a direct 
descendant of the early nineteenth century British system.22 The first 
Maltese jury trial occurred about 25 years after the adoption of the United 
States Constitution.23  
Although substantial differences exist between Malta and the United 
States as nations, the similarities of Maltese and American jury trials are 
patent. If an American trial lawyer were to observe a Maltese jury trial, he 
would witness a familiar and comfortable scene. The courtroom is set up 
physically the same as an American court.24 The Maltese system, like its 
American counterpart, is adversarial rather than inquisitorial. A jury is 
selected and empaneled to decide the issues of fact. The overall procedural 
structures—opening statements, testimony presented through alternating 
                                                                                                             
or even “country” given that so many countries are now multinational in their 
makeup. Nonetheless, this Article opts for “nation” for clarity in distinction to a 
“state” of the United States. No offense nor confusion is intended. 
 16. See John C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 
626–27 (1998). 
 17. See Hans, supra note 3, at 277 (“The cross-country comparisons allow us 
to take advantage of existing variation in different countries, akin to a natural 
experiment.” (citation omitted)). 
 18. The World Factbook: Malta, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www 
.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mt.html (last visited Sept. 30, 
2015) (expand “Government” section). 
 19. Id. (expand “Geography” section). 
 20. Id. (expand “Introduction” section). 
 21. Even today—for purposes of interpreting the civil jury right in United 
States federal court—the reference point is jury rights in England in 1791. See 
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (“[T]he thrust of the [Seventh] 
Amendment was to preserve the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791 . . . .”); see 
generally Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment 
Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005 (1992). 
 22. See Comment, The Jury System in Malta, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 570, 570 
(1964) (transcript of a public lecture delivered by J.J. Cremona in the Royal 
University of Malta on the December 7, 1960). 
 23. Id. (trial by jury introduced in Malta in 1815). 
 24. The information regarding the set-up of the Maltese jury system was 
derived by the Author’s first-hand observation of a Maltese jury trial from June 
6, 2011 to June 17, 2011.  




examination and cross-examination of witnesses, evidentiary objections 
and rulings, closing arguments, judge’s instructions, verdict, and 
judgment—appear rather American (or British). Any American trial 
lawyer would not only recognize a Maltese trial, but the lawyer would also 
understand it, as Maltese trials are often conducted in English.25  
For American jury reformists, Malta’s greatest utility to the United 
States may come from focusing on where the two systems diverge. The 
procedural divergences are most dramatic in the details of jury selection 
and in the approach to jury participation in trial. Although both peremptory 
strikes and for cause strikes exist in the Maltese system,26 voir dire is 
nonexistent. In Malta, when a witness is finished answering cross-
examination questions, a microphone is passed around the jury box to 
facilitate and encourage jurors to directly question the witness.27 Maltese 
jurors are expected to actively talk to each other at all stages of the trial. 
This small Mediterranean nation presents an opportunity for the 
United States. Malta offers relevant, concrete data via a “natural 
experiment”28 about how reforms in the areas of jury selection and jury 
participation might develop in America. Malta potentially illustrates for 
the United States a world with no voir dire, with active juror questioning, 
and with ubiquitous jury deliberation.  
Finally, in a less direct way, Malta’s experience with jury reform adds 
another aspect to the American discussion, as the Mediterranean nation 
allows non-unanimous verdicts.29 This type of verdict is not unique to 
Malta, as two American states—Oregon30 and Louisiana31—allow felony 
                                                                                                             
 25. Because of Malta’s geographic location—an island nation in the 
Mediterranean Sea that is south of Sicily, north of Libya, and east of Crete—the 
country is a gateway to Western Europe. The World Factbook: Malta, supra note 
18 (expand “Geography” section). Its most frequent recurring major crime is drug 
crime, typically the importation and sale of heroin. Interview with Judge Michael 
Mallia, Judge of Criminal Court, Malta (June 21, 2013). The accused is often not 
Maltese. Id. Maltese law gives the accused the option of a trial in either Maltese or 
English. Id. The official languages of Malta are Maltese and English. Language, 
VISITMALTA.COM, http://www.visitmalta.com/en/language (last visited Oct. 20, 
2015). Lawyers and judges are bilingual, and Malta keeps a separate list of possible 
jurors who speak English. Interview with Judge Michael Mallia, supra. 
 26. See CRIM. CODE art. 611(2) (Malta). 
 27. See id. art. 459 (allowing jury questioning of witnesses). 
 28. Hans, supra note 3, at 277. 
 29. See CRIM. CODE art. 610(1) (Malta) (stating that a jury shall consist of 
nine jurors); id. art. 468 (requiring a consensus of six jurors in a verdict). 
 30. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 11; State v. Sawyer, 501 P.2d 792, 793 (Or. 1972) 
(en banc). 
 31. The Louisiana constitution requires a unanimous decision in capital 
cases, but not in cases where “the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard 
labor.” LA. CONST. art. I, § 17(A); see also State v. Bertrand, 6 So. 3d 738, 743 
(La. 2009). 




convictions on non-unanimous votes, and the United States Supreme Court 
has upheld the constitutionality of non-unanimous convictions.32 But Maltese 
verdicts may be unique in the self-perceived value of non-unanimous 
verdicts—insiders to Maltese jury trials believe that although most Maltese 
nine-person juries actually come to a unanimous verdict, the reported verdict, 
nonetheless, is seven to two. The reasoning is that every juror can return to 
their community and claim whatever side of the vote they wish.33 Thus, the 
vote provides insulation by preventing anxiety over post-verdict public 
disapproval from corrupting the integrity of the trial. Minimizing this anxiety 
is a system concern given little, if any, attention in the United States.  
Part I of this Article describes the history of Malta and Maltese jury 
practice. Part II briefly summarizes the parallel history of American jury 
practice. Part III compares and contrasts the structural aspects of 
contemporary Maltese and American jury practice. Part IV draws insights 
from Malta that add to the understanding of how American jury practice 
is structured and may be refined. Part V anticipates and responds to 
potential criticisms of the approach and conclusions of this Article. 
I. A CONDENSED HISTORY OF MALTA AND A MORE 
DETAILED HISTORY OF MALTESE JURY PRACTICE34 
Malta, an archipelago of islands in the Mediterranean Sea, has been 
controlled at various points in history by the Phoenicians, the Carthaginians, 
the Romans, the Byzantines, the Arabs, the Normans, the Argonese, the 
Order of the Knights of St. John, Napoleon’s France, and, for most of the 
past two centuries, the British.35 Twice in Malta’s history, in the sixteenth 
and twentieth centuries, Malta has been the site of military sieges on which 
all of western European history arguably turned.36 Malta has been an 
                                                                                                             
 32. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410–11 (1972). 
 33. See Interview with Judge Michael Mallia, supra note 25. A comparative 
law analysis should consider how an insider to the system would view the trial. 
See Reitz, supra note 16, at 628. 
 34. This section of the Article goes into some detail about the development 
of jury practices in Malta because Malta does not have in its current literature a 
manuscript, book, or article that pulls this history together in one place. Malta’s 
lack of extant literature self-describing its procedures and rationales is a limitation 
of this Article. See Reitz, supra note 16, at 630–31. 
 35. See History, VISITMALTA.COM, http://www.visitmalta.com/en/history (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2015). 
 36. See generally Knights of St. John, VISITMALTA.COM, http://www.visitmalta 
.com/en/knights-of-stjohn (last visited Oct. 20, 2015); British Period, VISITMALTA 
.COM, http://www.visitmalta.com/en/british-period (last visited Oct. 20, 2015). 




independent country since 1964 and is a member state of the European 
Union and the British Commonwealth.37 
Demographically, Malta is the rough equivalent of a mid-sized, highly 
homogeneous, densely populated community in the United States. The 2011 
census reported the population of Malta as 417,432 people.38 Malta’s land 
mass is 122 square miles.39 Population is evenly divided male and female,40 
and astonishingly evenly spread by age.41 Over 90% of the country age 10 
or older is fluent in Maltese, and over 80% speak English well or average.42 
Slightly over two-thirds of Malta’s population has completed at least a 
secondary level of education.43 The Vatican estimates that roughly 95% of 
Malta is Roman Catholic—the highest percentage of anywhere in the world 
other than Italy.44  
A. Maltese Juries under the British 
Malta’s tradition of trial by jury began immediately following the 
British-aided Maltese rebellion against Napoleon Bonaparte, which began 
on September 2, 1798.45 Charles Cameron, the First British Commissioner 
of Malta, began the century and a half of British rule of Malta on May 14, 
1801.46 Twenty-five years later, on November 16, 1826, the architect of 
the current Maltese jury system, Sir John Stoddart, began his tenure as the 
President of the High Court of Appeal and Senior Member of the Supreme 
Council of Justice.47  
                                                                                                             
 37. See History, VISITMALTA.COM, http://www.visitmalta.com/en/history 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2015). 
 38. See NAT’L STATISTICS OFFICE, MALTA, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND 
HOUSING 2011: PRELIMINARY REPORT 3–4 tbl.1 (2012), available at https://nso 
.gov.mt/en/publicatons/Publications_by_Unit/Documents/01_Methodology_and_ 
Research/Census2011_PreliminaryReport.pdf [hereinafter 2011 CENSUS].  
 39. See Matt Rosenberg, The World’s Smallest Countries, ABOUT EDUC. 
http://geography.about.com/cs/countries/a/smallcountries.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 
2015). 
 40. 2011 CENSUS, supra note 38, at xviii fig.4. 
 41. Id. at xix fig.5. 
 42. Id. at xxi.  
 43. See 1 MALTA NAT’L STATISTICS OFFICE, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND 
HOUSING 2005 tbl.49 (2007). 
 44. See David M. Cheney, Statistics by Country, CH (Nov. 20, 2005), http://www 
.catholic-hierarchy.org/country/sc3.html. 
 45. See HUGH W. HARDING, MALTESE LEGAL HISTORY UNDER BRITISH 
RULE (1801-1836), at 2 (1968). 
 46. See id. at 1. 
 47. See id. at 188. 




Malta first empaneled juries in 1815, where issues of fact in piracy 
trials were left to juries to avoid abuse of power by the admiralty.48 
Pursuant to a proposal by Stoddart, through Proclamation VI of 1829, on 
October 15, 1829, Malta expanded the jury right and adopted a form of 
trial by jury for all major criminal cases.49  
Stoddart proposed that trial juries should be composed of three 
Maltese males and three Englishmen, with a President to be appointed 
“from the more intelligent classes (such as Police Magistrates, Advocates, 
Civil Officers of the Higher Ranks, Merchants, etc.).”50 Verdicts were 
decided by majority vote, with the President holding the tiebreaking vote, 
if necessary.51 Verdicts would find each assertion of the indictment proved 
or not proved so as to absolve jurors of the pressure of finding guilty or 
not guilty.52 Jury trials would occur in the determination of serious 
felonies, meaning capital cases and crimes punishable by condemnation to 
the galleys for seven years or more.53 Stoddart advocated that jury trials 
“would be considered a benefit by every Englishman and by the best 
informed of the Maltese.”54 Following the October 15, 1829 adoption of 
Stoddart’s proposal, the first five jury trials “succeeded beyond all 
expectations.”55 
B. Juries in Post-British Malta 
Malta gained independence from Britain in 1964.56 The manuscripts 
of Professor J. J. Cremona57 and A. J. Mamo58 recorded the form of jury 
trials at the time. Professor Cremona was the author of the draft Malta 
                                                                                                             
 48. See id. at 148–50. For an island nation strategically located in the center 
of the Mediterranean trade routes, admiralty and piracy were central issues in 
Malta for longer than recorded history. The creation of juries in response to 
distrust of the alternative echoes the concern animating the original jury rights in 
the United States. See Michael Teter, Acts of Emotion: Analyzing Congressional 
Involvement in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 153, 163–64 
(2008); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (asserting that the jury 
provides an accused with an “inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or 
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge”). 
 49. See HARDING, supra note 45, at 148–150. 
 50. See id. at 191–92. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. at 193. 
 53. See id. at 191. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. at 258. 
 56. The World Factbook: Malta, supra note 18 (expand “Introduction” 
section). 
 57. See The Jury System in Malta, supra note 22.  
 58. See A. J. Mamo, Notes on Criminal Procedure 132–33 (1942) (on file in 
the Melitensia Collection of the Library of the University of Malta). 




Independence Constitution, and at the time he published his manuscript in 
1964, he was completing his tenure as Attorney General of Malta.59 Mamo 
was the first President of Malta, and he wrote his “Notes on Criminal 
Procedure” in 1942—the year he joined the Attorney General’s office as 
Crown Counsel; for years afterwards law students in Malta would purchase 
them as a resource.60 At the time of Maltese independence, jury trials still 
occurred only in criminal matters.61 Perhaps unsurprisingly in a small 
country, much of Maltese procedure is organic rather than codified, and 
although the Preamble of Proclamation VI of 1829 contemplated the 
possibility of civil juries, these juries have never been put into practice.62 
Within criminal law, substantive Maltese law derived from the Napoleonic 
codes, but procedural law was modeled on the English system.63 To be eligible 
for jury service, one had to be a male over 21 residing in Malta, of good 
character, fluent in Maltese, a property owner, and competent—meaning 
neither interdicted nor incapacitated, not involved in bankruptcy proceedings, 
neither currently a criminal defendant nor a convicted criminal, and not unfit 
to serve due to a notorious physical or mental defect.64 Postal workers, 
apothecaries, and doctors were exempt from jury service.65 Maltese juries were 
comprised of nine jurors,66 with the potential of up to three alternates.67 Lists 
of potential jurors were compiled annually—one general list and another of 
jurors who spoke English.68 From these lists, monthly venires were compiled.69 
Sub-lists were also compiled of jurors with prior experience, and from this list 
jury foremen were selected.70  
At time of trial, potential jurors were assembled from the lists, with 
lawyers for each party having three peremptory challenges, and unlimited 
challenges for cause.71 The lawyers had to exercise these challenges 
immediately upon a juror’s name being randomly drawn at the commencement 
of a trial, as the juror became part of the jury immediately once he was sworn 
in.72 All juries were sequestered during trial, and without leave of court had 
                                                                                                             
 59. See 1 MICHAEL J. SCHIAVONE, DICTIONARY OF MALTESE BIOGRAPHIES 
A-F 612–13 (2009). 
 60. See 2 MICHAEL J. SCHIAVONE, DICTIONARY OF MALTESE BIOGRAPHIES 
G-Z 1084 (2009). 
 61. See The Jury System in Malta, supra note 22, at 573. 
 62. See id.  
 63. See id. at 572.  
 64. See id. at 131–32. 
 65. See id. at 132. 
 66. Id. at 573.  
 67. See id. at 576; Mamo, supra note 58, at 133–34. 
 68. See Mamo, supra note 58, at 132–33. 
 69. See id. at 133. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. at 134–35. 
 72. See id. 




no access to food or water during deliberations.73 But within these 
parameters, jurors were robustly empowered during trials, as they could 
discuss the case among themselves throughout trial, could directly question 
witnesses, and could put questions to the judge during deliberations.74 A jury 
reached a verdict—which required the consensus of at least six jurors—of 
guilty, not guilty, or not proven.75  
Today, the Maltese Criminal Code changes jury practice very little 
from the one Cremona and Mamo described.76 There are no civil juries.77 
There are two criminal courts in Malta, with one each on the island of 
Malta and the island of Gozo, and all jury trials are held in the criminal 
court in Valletta on the island of Malta.78 Although occasional public 
criticism of juries in Malta endures,79 the criminal jury has “merged so 
completely into the Maltese legal system that is [sic] has long been 
regarded as an essential and living part of it.”80 
                                                                                                             
 73. See id. at 193, 198. 
 74. See id. at 193, 195, 198. 
 75. See id. at 198–200. 
 76. See CRIM. CODE arts. 436–80, 603–19, 611(2) (Malta). 
 77. See Seán Patrick Donlan, Biagio Andò & David Edward Zammit, “A 
Happy Union”? Malta’s Legal Hybridity, 27 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 165, 199 
(2012). 
 78. See Email from Judge Michael Mallia, Judge for Criminal Court, Malta, 
to Author (June 9, 2014) (on file with author). At the time of this email, the judge 
of this court was Michael Mallia. Judge Michael Mallia served as Judge of the 
Superior Court of Malta from September 29, 2009 to March 26, 2015. See 
Curriculum Vitae, Mr. Justice Michael Mallia, available at www.ju 
diciarymalta.gov.mt/file.aspx?f=545; Not Enough Judges and Magistrates on the 
Bench – Judge Michael Mallia, MALTA INDEPENDENT (Mar. 26, 2015), 
http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2015-03-26/local-news/Not-enough-
Judges-and-Magistrates-on-the-bench-Judge-Michael-Mallia-6736132814. To 
the extent there are “unwritten rules” of Maltese jury practice, he is an excellent 
resource; indeed some of his tenure he was the jurist presiding over every Maltese 
jury trial. Email from Judge Michael Mallia, Judge for Criminal Court, Malta, to 
Author, supra. Judge Mallia’s descriptions of the actual, but unwritten, aspects of 
Maltese practice are not only interesting anecdotally, but also are important for a 
thorough comparative law analysis. See Reitz, supra note 16, at 629–30. Judge 
Mallia reviewed for accuracy this Article’s descriptions of Maltese practice. 
 79. See, e.g., Miram Dunn, Acquittals Blamed on Jury System, MALTA 
TODAY (July 8, 2001); Editorial, The Jury System, MALTA TODAY (Apr. 8, 2001); 
Matthew Vella, Still on Jurors List!, MALTA TODAY (Dec. 17, 2006). 
 80. Donlan et al., supra note 77, at 200 (quoting The Jury System in Malta, 
supra note 22, at 572). 




II. A CONDENSED HISTORY OF AMERICAN JURY PRACTICE  
The United States Constitution provides for criminal juries in Article 
III81 and the Sixth Amendment,82 and provides for civil juries in the 
Seventh Amendment.83 Even when the Founders adopted these 
provisions, juries were controversial in that the public perceived juries 
as incompetent and easily manipulated.84 Still, the Founders protected 
the right to a jury trial in three separate parts of the Constitution.85 This 
protection arose primarily because one catalyst of the American 
Revolution was a perceived attempt by the British to take away jury 
rights.86 Further, American colonists frankly preferred the risk of inept 
jurors to the risk of corrupt judges.87 
At the time of the American Revolution, every colony had a jury trial 
system derived from the British system.88 Although the text of the 
Constitution does not explicitly adopt the British form of jury practice, 
the courts of the United States repeatedly have held that the 
constitutionally-preserved jury rights are indeed the jury practices of the 
British.89 Jury reform pressures have never been far from public 
consciousness, and the past two centuries have been characterized as a 
steady trend toward a retraction of the role of the American jury.90 Even 
though the frequency of jury trials is currently declining,91 the core right 
to trial by jury in America, especially in a criminal trial, remains robust 
and seemingly inviolate.92 
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III. CONTEMPORARY SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
CURRENT MALTESE JURY PRACTICE AND TYPICAL 
JURY PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 
Maltese and American jury practices are virtually identical in broad 
structure, but sometimes divergent in detail. In particular, the countries 
differ in how jurors are selected, the degree to which jurors are active and 
interactive during a trial, and how jurors reach a verdict.93 
Malta has an expansive view of who can be a juror. Although the age 
of majority in Malta is 18,94 a juror must be at least 21.95 In addition, a 
juror must be a resident of Malta; speak Maltese; be of good character; 
neither be a felon nor accused of a felony; not currently in bankruptcy, 
interdicted, incapacitated; and not be “reported unfit by notorious physical 
or mental defect.”96 Government officials, soldiers, doctors, pharmacists, 
teachers, professors, police officers, and persons over the age of 60 are 
exempt.97  
The United States has a similarly expansive view of juror 
qualifications. In the majority of American states, a juror must be a citizen 
of the state, a resident of the county in which the trial is held, and 18 years 
of age.98 A person may be exempted from jury service if that person is not 
proficient in English, has a felony conviction, or lacks either citizenship 
or residency.99 The most common exemptions are prior jury service or 
age.100 Many jurisdictions have “designated various occupational or status 
roles for which citizens could claim an exemption from jury service (e.g., 
political officeholders, judicial officers, sole caregivers of young children 
including nursing mothers, or sole caregivers of incompetent adults).”101 
More than one-third of eligible Americans will serve as a juror at least 
once in their lifetime.102 
In Malta, the actual selection of jurors is a largely random system. Two 
lists of possible jurors—one of Maltese speakers and another of English 
speakers—are generated twice annually, and sub-lists are compiled within 
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these lists of those with prior jury experience.103 The lists are generated 
from a meeting attended by “the Commissioner of Police or his 
representative, the Senior Magistrate, the Attorney General or his 
representative, the President of the Chamber of Advocates and the 
President of the Chamber of Legal Procurators.”104 Individuals on the list 
are identified by name, profession, and residence.105 Venires are formed 
from these lists monthly.106 Juries are comprised of eight jurors drawn at 
random from the venire, a foreperson drawn from the sub-list, and up to 
six alternates.107 Because Malta does not have voir dire, peremptory strikes 
are rarely if ever exercised.108  
In the United States, judges and lawyers are far more proactive in jury 
selection. For the most part, in the United States juror source lists are 
generated from voter registration lists, driver’s license lists, or both.109 The 
large majority of American courts allow access to at least a juror’s name 
and address before jury selection begins.110 Most also collect preliminary 
voir dire information, such as a prospective juror’s marital status, 
occupation, and number and ages of any of the prospective juror’s 
children.111 From there, either the attorneys alone, or with the help of the 
judge, conduct voir dire, although some states mirror the federal approach 
of predominantly or exclusively judge-conducted voir dire.112 In non-
capital felony trials, the median time spent on jury selection in state court 
is two hours.113 The vast majority of states require a 12-person jury in 
felony trials.114  
In Malta, jurors are active decision-makers throughout trial. During 
the run of the trial, jurors have the right to question witnesses.115 After one 
round of lawyer-conducted direct examination and one round of lawyer-
conducted cross-examination, a microphone is handed to the jury box, 
allowing the jurors to ask any questions they have.116 Jurors also are free 
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to discuss the case with each other during trial.117 Additionally, the judge 
sums up the evidence for the jury and explains the law to them,118 and the 
jury can ask the judge questions.119  
Maltese law provides that as to each charge in the indictment, the 
verdict can be guilty, not guilty, or not proven.120 In practice, however, a 
verdict that includes the latter option is not provided.121 Rather, “[j]urors 
may be instructed, if the case so warrants, to find guilt in a lesser charge 
even though not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Indictment provided 
the lesser charge is incorporated in the main charge.”122 Six votes are 
needed to convict.123  
Maltese law forbids lawyers from speaking to jurors, even informally, 
after the conclusion of a trial.124 Although juries are no longer required to 
be sequestered during trial,125 in practice they usually are.126 Juries are 
limited in their authority to deciding issues of fact and applying those 
findings of fact to the law.127  
In the United States, of course, there is no mimicking of the Maltese 
“pass around the microphone” practice and there is, at most, limited juror 
interaction with the trial in general. More than two-thirds of courts now 
allow jurors to take notes and to have at least one copy of the written 
instructions, and over half give jurors guidance on deliberations.128 Or, put 
another way, one-third of states still do not allow juror note-taking, one-
half give no guidance to jurors on how to deliberate, and one third do not 
even provide jurors with one written copy of the jury instructions.129 Only 
14% of state criminal trials allow juror-written questions to witnesses, and 
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less than 1% allow jurors to discuss the evidence before deliberations 
commence.130 All but two states require a unanimous verdict in criminal 
cases.131 Therefore, in the United States, modification and reflection on 
jury practices is always a work in progress.132  
IV. MALTA CAN FILL GAPS IN THE AMERICAN 
CONSIDERATION OF JURY REFORM 
In both Malta and the United States, felony jury trials look 
fundamentally the same and have broadly identical procedures. Even at 
the granular level, remarkable similarity exists within some aspects, such 
as who is qualified for jury service or what information is known about the 
potential jurors before they appear for jury duty. Because of the broad 
similarities, Malta can be a useful resource to the United States in the areas 
where there are differences, filling in informational gaps. Those 
procedural differences primarily arise in how the jury is selected and how 
the jurors interact with each other and with witnesses during the trial. 
A. Jury Selection 
Robust debate exists in the American literature about many aspects of 
jury selection.133 Within this literature, many scholars put significant focus 
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on the utility of peremptory strikes.134 Occasionally, an argument appears 
for the elimination of peremptory strikes altogether.135 
Peremptory strikes, the right to which lies at the heart of the rationale 
for robust jury questioning in the United States, pre-date the country 
itself.136 The United States Supreme Court has explained that the purpose 
of peremptory challenges is to “eliminate the extremes of partiality on both 
sides” and to assure that jurors “will decide on the basis of the 
evidence.”137 Yet defending the American approach on the reason 
proffered by the Court is difficult. An underlying assumption of both 
judges and lawyers in the American system is that counsel are selecting 
the most biased jury possible.138 In an adversarial system, the assumption 
argues, this competition will balance out the jury.139 The underlying 
premise is that the background of a particular juror is a valid place marker 
for a point of view.140 That premise is debatable.141 If the premise is wrong, 
then the assumption fails, and so the rationale for voir dire weakens. But 
even accepting the premise, broadly speaking, little reason exists to 
believe that peremptory challenges work, or at least work as intended.142 
Therefore, one then returns to the question of the value of voir dire. 
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Great Britain, the ancestral system of both the United States and Malta, 
has largely abandoned voir dire.143 The United States Supreme Court, 
commenting on the British disuse of voir dire, concluded that in Great 
Britain jury selection was unnecessary.144 Rather, the Court noted, due in 
part to Britain’s superior control of pre-trial publicity, “‘court and counsel 
have confidence in the impartiality and integrity of trial jurors . . .’”145  
The only empirically demonstrated benefit of attorney-conducted voir 
dire is that it generates more candid responses than judge-conducted voir 
dire.146 But that benefit only points to who should question potential 
jurors, not whether there is a general benefit from questioning potential 
jurors at all. Any layperson observing American jury selection quickly 
questions whether voir dire enhances the likelihood of justice, as opposed 
to simply favoring the side with the more clever lawyer.147 That skepticism 
itself undermines the rationale for voir dire, as it goes to the heart of the 
rationale of jury questioning as a means to achieve confidence in jury 
impartiality and integrity. 
Although the gain from voir dire is questionable, the cost is 
undisputed. Voir dire and peremptory strikes take time, expend lawyer and 
court resources, and are quite possibly ineffective.148 Yet in the American 
literature, the closest anyone comes to contemplating the complete 
elimination of voir dire is Professor Akhil Amar’s suggestion that, “[b]y 
and large, the first twelve persons picked by lottery should form the 
jury.”149 As is suggested by the phrase “by and large,” even Professor 
Amar, who also largely advocates for the elimination of most strikes for 
cause, cannot truly envision and evaluate the possibility of no voir dire 
whatsoever.150 Unsurprisingly, given this state of the literature, no 
American studies have tested a scenario without voir dire. 
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And, of course, no example from the American courts exists. Today, 
all American states and the federal courts have voir dire.151 Roughly 45% 
of states have attorney-dominated voir dire, approximately 20% of states 
have judge-dominated voir dire, and about 35% of states have equally 
shared judge- and counsel-conducted voir dire.152 Apparently in the United 
States, eliminating voir dire is beyond imaginable. Ironically, from the 
perspective of a Maltese lawyer, almost the exact opposite view emerges. 
In her doctoral thesis, Dr. Cachia captured this sentiment, explaining that 
“the American system[’s] . . . obsession with the identity of the jurors is 
totally erroneous for the whole emphasis of the system is not on the trial 
itself, but on the jury. Indeed, it is submitted that each trial by jury is 
becoming a trial of jurors.”153  
In this regard, Americans advocating for the elimination of peremptory 
strikes should be interested in Malta. This small, Mediterranean nation 
shows that a court system can function smoothly without voir dire, without 
the exercise of peremptory strikes, and with only rare strikes for cause. 
Although the Maltese jury essentially is comprised of the first nine names 
randomly drawn from the list, no chaos results. Malta suffers no pervasive 
protest from the public, from lawyers, or from judges about the 
composition of juries.  
Of course, one may validly respond that not much can be gleaned from 
a lack of protests on jury composition. Malta’s lack of reports of anecdotal 
displeasure does not equate to public confidence in jury impartiality and 
integrity, or even to actual jury impartiality and integrity. Unsurprisingly, 
the literature of this young nation has yet to include even a compilation of 
its jury procedures, let alone a study of the consequences of current jury 
procedures. Malta’s experience can only go so far in establishing, rather 
than merely suggesting, that eliminating voir dire would not impair either 
actual or perceived jury impartiality or integrity. 
But, in this regard, additional confidence comes from a third nation—
the Republic of Ireland. Ireland, like Malta, has both peremptory strikes 
and strikes for cause, and has no voir dire.154 In 2010, the Law Reform 
Commission of the Republic of Ireland published a 240-page report on 
jury service.155 In its work on jury reform, the Commission looked 
                                                                                                             
 151. See MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 27–28 (classifying voir dire practices 
for each state and acknowledging that federal courts perform voir dire as well). 
 152. See id. at 27–28.  
 153. Cachia, supra note 95, at 112. 
 154. See LAW REFORM COMM’N, JURY SERVICE (2010), available at http: 
//www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/LRC%20JuriesCP%20f
ull.pdf. 
 155. See id. The Commission “is an independent statutory body established by 
the Law Reform Commission Act 1975. The Commission’s principal role is to 
keep the law under review and to make proposals for reform, in particular by 




extensively at jury selection, particularly considering the history of Irish 
law and procedure, the approaches of other nations, the academic literature 
on the topic, and the merits of the arguments both for and against peremptory 
strikes.156 The Commission concluded that retaining the right to peremptory 
strikes and strikes for cause was important but that questioning of jurors, 
whether oral or written, was more harmful than helpful.157 
Thus, Ireland and Malta go further than the most imaginative of 
American scholars. Although some commentators in the American literature 
advocate for the elimination of peremptory strikes, virtually none advocate 
for the elimination of voir dire entirely because strikes for cause remain. For 
example, even Professor Amar, who advocates for eliminating most strikes 
for cause, writes, “I propose getting rid of . . . most voir dire.”158 The obvious 
reason that the American literature does not contemplate eliminating voir 
dire is that if any strikes for cause exist, a lawyer would want to retain the 
ability to evaluate a possible strike.  
When Dr. Cachia reflected on the Maltese experience with jury 
selection, she did not advocate for allowing juror questioning, but she did 
advocate for disseminating an American-like written juror questionnaire.159 
In this regard, the Irish and Dr. Cachia diverge, as the Irish Commission’s 
report explicitly considers and rejects the utility of even written questions.160 
One should note that, in the absence of even written questionnaires, 
Maltese and Irish lawyers work off of the same basic informational pallet 
as an American lawyer would in the absence of voir dire, meaning the 
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potential juror’s physical appearance, name, address, age, and occupation.161 
An American lawyer would recoil at this lack of information on the jurors, 
as would Dr. Cachia, who works as a barrister in an adversarial system in 
the Maltese courts.162 But when the Irish Commission, which in contrast to 
Dr. Cachia has no client interest to consider, looked at jury service from a 
societal perspective, the Commission concluded that justice was best served 
by not allowing attorneys or judges to conduct any inquiry of jurors beyond 
basic information.163 
One might postulate that Malta’s system works well for a very small 
and insular place, and that Ireland’s system works well for a similarly small 
and insular place—outside of Dublin—but that extended voir dire is 
necessary in America to prevent the attorneys from knowing nothing about 
a potential juror. This is a testable postulation. Neither Malta nor extra-
Dublin, Ireland are less populous or less densely populated than parts of the 
United States—arguably, measured by population per square mile, Malta is 
densely populated. Thus, if the relevant variable was population size or 
density—both highly variable in the United States—one would expect to 
see the length of voir dire in the United States roughly correlate to the 
population of the state, and diverge between dense low population states 
such as Rhode Island and disperse low population states such as Montana. 
The National Center for State Courts compiled a list of the average length 
of voir dire in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.164 No such pattern 
is present.165  
So what can be concluded from all of this? The Maltese and Irish 
approaches of eliminating questioning of jurors while retaining the right 
to both peremptory and for cause strikes perhaps should be characterized 
as provocative but not definitive. The Maltese and Irish experiences should 
undermine, at least to some degree, any confidence we have in the 
conclusion that voir dire is a necessary evil to having a meaningful right 
to a peremptory or for cause strike and therefore, the Maltese and Irish 
                                                                                                             
 161. See supra Part III. 
 162. For information on Dr. Chachia, see Dr. Lorna Mifsud Cachia B.A., Mag. 
Juris (Eur & Comp. Law), LL.D, Adv.Trib.Eccles.Melit, DINGLI & DINGLI LAW 
FIRM, http://www.dingli.com.mt/page.asp?p=7143 (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
 163. See LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 154, at 165–67. 
 164. See MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 77. 
 165. Medium population states, such as South Carolina, Alabama and 
Virginia, top the list for shortest average voir dire, ranging from 30 to 60 minutes. 
Id. Although some large population states like New York and California are near 
the bottom, so too is sparsely populated Alaska, and these three range from four 
to five hours of average voir dire. Id. And sparsely populated Montana, Rhode 
Island, and Wyoming find themselves squarely within the middle with much 
larger states, such as Texas and Florida, with all of these states spending an 
average of two hours on voir dire. Id.  




experiences should be thought of as natural experiments that provide data 
that theoreticians in the United States should consider. 
B. Jury Interaction 
From the perspective of an American lawyer, another deeply 
incongruous aspect of a Maltese jury trial is how the jury behaves during 
trial. Malta actually encourages juror questions, as a microphone literally 
is passed through the jury box immediately following one round each of 
direct and cross-examination.166 And throughout trial, jurors are expected 
to discuss the case and their evolving views of it.167  
Malta’s view of the way a jury should act and interact during trial is, 
quite literally, foreign to the form of most American trials. In all but a 
handful of civil trials in the United States, American juries are instructed 
to not discuss the trial at all until deliberations begin.168 Typical is Kansas, 
where by statute:  
If the jury is permitted to separate, either during the trial or after 
the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished by the 
court that: (1) It is their duty not to converse with, or allow 
themselves to be addressed by any other person on any subject of 
the trial, and that any attempt to do so should be immediately 
reported by them to the court; (2) it is their duty not to make any 
final determinations or express any opinion on any subject of the 
trial until the case is finally submitted to them; and (3) such 
admonition shall apply to every subsequent separation of the 
jury.169 
In recent years, a robust discussion has taken place in American literature 
on the desirability of an interactive jury.170 And though the courtroom 
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empirical work on juror questions in particular has been a slightly bumpy 
road, this road has pointed in a clear direction. The social science literature 
would predict that juror questions are of value to the fact-finding function 
of the jury.171 The debate in the American legal literature largely is not about 
whether juror questions have fact-finding benefits. Rather, the debate about 
juror questions devolves into arguments about balancing informed advocacy 
and decision making against concerns about distraction, disruption, loss of 
objectivity, wasting time, or distorting the proper role of the jury.172 Notably, 
even those opposing juror questions do not assert that jurors should ideally 
be passive receptacles of information.173  
In an effort to bring empirical evidence to the debate over various 
methods to increase juror interaction with witnesses and each other, social 
scientists Larry Heuer and Steven Penrod conducted two courtroom studies 
in which they attained “the data for the first experiment . . . from the judges, 
lawyers, and jurors for 67 Wisconsin state court trials; the data for the 
second from the judges, lawyers, and jurors for 160 state and federal court 
trials conducted in 33 states.”174 Within this set, Heuer and Penrod studied 
juror questions in 33 Wisconsin criminal trials and 71 federal trials.175 The 
results of the work of Heuer and Penrod largely affirmed the expectations 
of advocates of juror questions. As one frequently raised concern with juror 
questions is the possibility of jurors asking objectionable questions,176 the 
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studies assuage these concerns by suggesting that “[j]urors do not ask 
inappropriate questions.”177 
Another closely related concern with juror questions is that counsel 
will be reluctant to object to juror questions.178 Again, the studies of 104 
trials indicate that this is not a problem.179 The concern is raised that 
allowing jurors to be active questioners will alter the neutrality of the 
jurors as decision makers.180 The Wisconsin and federal studies found, 
“[j]urors allowed to ask questions do not become advocates rather than 
neutrals.”181 But in one respect, the results were surprising. Though the 
studies found that juror questions advanced juror understanding, juror 
questions did not advance reaching the truth nor assist the lawyers.182 
The Wisconsin and federal studies did little to quell any debate over 
the desirability of juror questions. Despite the results of these two studies, 
the concerns of bias, inappropriate questions, or pressures on advocates 
regarding objections all persisted.183 The National Center for State Courts, 
citing the work of Heuer and Penrod, among others, reported in its 2007 
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comprehensive study of jury practices in the state courts, “[a] substantial 
and growing body of empirical research has found that [permitting written 
juror questions], if properly controlled by the trial judge, improves juror 
comprehension without prejudicing litigants’ rights to a fair trial.”184 
Furthermore, even more recent studies, such as the Arizona Videotaping 
Project, indicated the need to limit juror questions to written questions in 
a controlled environment that provided tools for a judge to discourage too 
many questions.185  
Therefore, confining the focus only to juror questions, what can Malta, 
a country with so few jury trials that for several years all were conducted 
in a single courtroom,186 add to the discussion? In this regard, because 
Malta allows oral questions by jurors, Malta contributes in two ways. First, 
the country is a natural experiment that can provide further clarity on the 
desirability of written juror questions. Second, the Maltese experience 
suggests that if America decides that written juror questions should be 
allowed, then America will not have gone far enough; Malta illustrates that 
oral juror questions should also be allowed.  
The Maltese experience is a natural experiment that can further clarify 
whether written juror questions are desirable. The empirical compilation 
and interpretation of both the National Center for State Courts187 and the 
Arizona Videotaping Project188 suggest that juror questions under 
controlled conditions—to minimize jurors asking too many questions or 
the wrong questions—can improve trials. The question is whether 
controlled conditions are necessary. Malta provides the data to answer this 
question. Whatever concerns exist about an unchecked jury when juror 
questions are allowed, those concerns should be magnified when oral 
questions are allowed. Whatever pressure exists on judges and lawyers to 
not interfere with juror questions, those pressures magnify in the context 
of a question that is already asked, rather than just submitted in writing. 
Just imagine objecting to a juror question to that juror’s face. If the 
concerns are real about jurors asking too many questions or the wrong 
questions, those concerns should be magnified and inescapable in Malta. 
But in Malta, those concerns are not apparent.  
                                                                                                             
 184. MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 34–35; see also Dann, supra note 170, at 
1239–46, 1253–55. 
 185. See Juror Questions, supra note 170, at 1965–72. Pilot programs also 
have been undertaken in New Jersey and Minnesota. See Mott, supra note 170, at 
1104–06; see Frank, supra note 130 (describing and analyzing a recent survey of 
Florida Ninth Judicial Circuit judges on jury questioning). 
 186. See supra note 78.  
 187. See MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 34–35.  
 188. See Juror Questions, supra note 170, at 1965–71. 




Malta’s experience also suggests that if the United States decides to 
allow that written juror questions, then it also has reason to allow oral juror 
questions. The primary benefit of having an interactive jury as decision-
maker is the pedagogical and psychological advancement of an informed 
verdict.189 The inevitable result of requiring the jury to submit questions in 
writing is twofold. First, the immediacy of the “question and answer” 
interchange is undermined. Second, some submitted questions will not be 
asked. Both of these work to the detriment of actively engaging individual 
jurors in their task. The benefit of oral juror questions is particularly 
compelling if people disregard the concerns animating the proposed 
restrictions on written juror questions. And the Maltese experience suggests 
those concerns should be ignored in America. 
Malta’s experience with an interactive jury, of course, takes this natural 
experiment one step further. Malta expects the jury to confer and deliberate 
throughout the entire course of the trial.190 
United States courtrooms recognize the interrelationship between juror 
questions and pre-deliberation jury discussion of the case. Occasionally, 
state courts in the United States have allowed jurors to discuss the evidence 
among themselves before final deliberations, albeit almost entirely in civil 
cases.191 In particular, Delvine states: 
In 1995, the Arizona Supreme Court allowed this practice and 
permitted trial court judges the discretion to prevent some juries from 
discussing cases prior to deliberation, allowing its impact to be 
assessed through a field experiment. Although data were still being 
collected and analyzed at the end of [the] review period, an initial 
report based on the questionnaire responses of trial participants 
suggests a mixed but generally positive reaction. Most jurors who 
were allowed to converse prior to deliberation reported doing so, and 
jurors as well as judges generally felt that predeliberation discussion 
produced beneficial results. At the same time, attorneys and litigants 
were somewhat less enthusiastic about the reform, and its impact on 
jury verdicts is still unclear.192 
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Interestingly, even though allowing in-trial deliberation was an Arizona 
experiment that was part of the same project that allowed juror questions, the 
reporters on the project did not analyze the two procedural reforms as an 
integrated possibility.193  
Although the American literature is largely silent on the effects of 
deliberation during trial, one presumes the rationale of the ubiquitous “don’t 
discuss the case among yourselves until deliberations” instruction is the 
concern that jurors will not decide the case in the manner intended. Reasons 
for skepticism of the instruction as a bandage for that concern are well-
founded, as “jurors often do not make decisions in the manner intended by the 
courts, regardless of how they are instructed.”194 Further, many jurors talk 
about the trial before deliberations begin, despite instructions to the contrary.195 
In 1993, Judge Michael Dann of the Maricopa County Superior Court in 
Phoenix, Arizona—having considered and rebuked the assumptions about 
how jurors behave—wrote, “future research should be conducted to 
demonstrate the effects of an ‘affirmative’ instruction permitting jurors, under 
certain restrictions, to discuss evidence during the trial.”196 In this regard, Malta 
can again serve as that research.  
The Maltese system consists of criminal trials where jurors routinely 
discuss the case throughout the trial.197 As a positive consequence of this, juror 
questions not only give advocates insight into an individual juror’s thinking, 
but also into the collective thinking of the jury. Obviously, when jurors are 
allowed to ask witnesses questions, the jurors implicitly share their individual 
views with each other and the advocates through their questions. Even if 
concerns with juries forming pre-deliberation conclusions are valid, that 
concern is essentially moot once juror questioning is allowed.  
Malta offers the United States a natural experiment on whether juror 
interaction during trial distorts trial accuracy or fairness. Notably, Malta has 
not articulated any concerns with its process. Rather, Judge Mallia would ask 
the following questions: “What do you expect the jurors to talk about? How do 
you expect them to reach their decision?”198  
C. An Additional Contribution of Malta to the American Discussion of Jury 
Reform: Non-Unanimous Verdicts 
The third way in which Malta diverges from the overwhelming 
majority of American states is that the former allows convictions with non-
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unanimous verdicts.199 That alone is not informative on the American 
experience. In Apodaca v. Oregon,200 the United States Supreme Court 
held that constitutionally, a state criminal court could convict by a 10-2 or 
an 11-1 vote,201 and indeed Oregon202 and Louisiana203 do not require 
unanimity in criminal felony trials.204 These two states provide the data set 
one needs to evaluate the typical terms of the debate on the unanimity 
requirement—balancing efficiency and justice, primarily in the context of 
a concern over hung jury rates.205 However, there is an apparent quirk of 
Maltese practice—albeit one that is known purely through anecdotal 
evidence—that adds to the American literature by raising a concern not 
previously directly considered, and thus merits at least brief exploration. 
For a period of time, a single Maltese judge, Michael Mallia, presided 
over every jury trial in Malta. He reported that it was his belief that 
although every trial he observed reported a seven to two verdict, the 
decisions were actually unanimous.206 His belief was that that jurors 
wanted the ability to return to their communities and if necessary claim 
that they—as an individual juror—did not vote to convict or to acquit.207 
In other words, by reporting a non-unanimous verdict, each juror is 
insulated from after-the-fact disapproval of the community and friends of 
the defendant or the juror.208  
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Assuming the accuracy of Judge Mallia’s anecdotal observations and 
conclusions, then does the Malta approach work? There is some reason to 
believe that it does.  
By code, Malta provides for three types of verdict: guilty, not guilty, 
and not proven.209 Scotland has utilized the not proven option for nearly 
300 years,210 and occasionally other nations, including the United States, 
consider the verdict.211  
The verdict choice of not proven accounts for between one-fifth and 
one-third of all Scottish acquittals.212 This latter statistic suggests, and 
initial empirical work confirms, that the verdict option of not proven 
“clearly impacts the decision making processes of jurors.”213 One 
explanation of this “impact” is that in between one-fifth and one-third of 
all Scottish acquittals, the jury is communicating that the prosecutor failed 
in meeting his or her burden, but the defendant may well actually be 
guilty.214 But theoretically, an alternative explanation is that in some 
instances, juries are choosing the not proven option as a means of lessening 
post-verdict stigma. 
Malta’s experience at least is suggestive in sorting through these two 
explanations because apparently Malta does not have hung juries.215 
Although Malta does not require unanimity, the empirical work in the 
United States demonstrates that eliminating the unanimity requirements 
does not eliminate hung juries.216 Add to this equation that although Malta 
by code allows a verdict of not proven, Malta does not actually make that 
option available to juries. Judge Mallia observes: 
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[J]urors cannot, out of their own volition return a “Not Proven” 
verdict but must be specifically asked to do so by the Court and 
then only when a doubt arises on any question of law upon the 
determination of which might depend the finding of the jury as to 
whether the accused is guilty of the offence. . . . As far as I am 
aware, this procedure has never been resorted to, at least for the 
past ten years.217 
This information helps to sort through the two explanations of the 
Scottish experience. If an advantage of the three verdict choices is 
positional insulation and the primary disadvantage of the unanimity 
requirement is the increase in hung juries, then in a jurisdiction that has 
another mechanism for positional insulation and does not require 
unanimity, there should be no hung juries, with or without the actual 
deployment of the three verdict choices. That is what is seen in Malta.218 
How does this inform on jury practice in the United States? A great 
deal of United States literature addresses controlling the influence on 
verdicts of either pretrial publicity or anxiety of jurors about pressure from 
others, such as media, lawyers, or casual acquaintances to decide a case a 
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certain way.219 In response at least to the latter of these concerns, the United 
States puts in place protections of juror privacy.220 The reasoning of jurors 
during deliberations also has protection.221 By doing so, the United States 
seems to recognize that the accuracy of jury fact-finding should not be 
distorted by juror concern about public reactions to the verdict. But 
apparently no consideration exists in either the American literature or jury 
procedures of the possibility of anxiety over the reproach a juror may face 
from his or her own friends and family, who have access to the juror despite 
any structural protection of juror privacy. 
It does not matter whether Judge Mallia’s observations and 
interpretations of Maltese jurors are idiosyncratic or typical. What matters 
is that his observations and interpretations bring to our attention a concern 
that has gotten little attention in the extant American literature— 
prophylactically insulating jurors from anxiety over opprobrium from 
friends and family post-verdict. Focusing on the Malta experience in 
conjunction with the Scottish experience identifies two mechanisms for 
achieving post-verdict positional insulation—verdict options of not proven 
and eliminating unanimity. 
But empirical work in the United States suggests a downside to the 
Malta approach. Recall that the mechanism of the Malta approach is the 
recurring experienced juror. Professors Dennis J. Devine, Laura D. 
Clayton, Benjamin B. Dunford, Rasmy Seying, and Jennifer Pryce 
comprehensively reviewed 44 years of empirical studies of American 
juries, and among their results found that “research on forepersons 
suggests they may be more influential than other jurors . . . [and] 
experienced jurors tend to be somewhat more pro-conviction and 
influential than inexperienced jurors, but they also appear to evaluate 
evidence in light of their experience in previous trials.”222 Thus, having an 
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experienced foreperson builds a bias, not based on evidence, in favor of 
conviction, which may be discordant with the presumption of innocence 
and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” conviction standard. 
That is not to say that adding the verdict option of not proven is a 
solution without concerns. For example, “for an innocent defendant, a Not 
Proven verdict is at best morally unsatisfactory and, at worst, may incur 
social sanctions by virtue the of associated stigma.”223 
The point of this discussion is not to argue for any particular solution, 
but rather to highlight that the Maltese experience raises a system concern 
that the United States should explore but apparently has yet to adequately 
consider. 
V. DEFENDING THE APPROACH OF THIS ARTICLE 
A fundamental challenge in any comparative law analysis is to control 
for differences, such as cultural differences and norms, that might 
minimize the utility of the comparison and to acknowledge differences that 
cannot be controlled.224 One may be tempted to explain all Maltese jury 
practices as responsive to the size, homogeneity, and geographic isolation 
of Malta. But the importance of those features to differentiating Malta 
from the United States may be far less than one might imagine. One can 
identify an American community of similar size, remoteness, and 
homogeneity to Malta, and examine whether the practices in that 
community still resemble typical American practices. 
Wichita, Kansas, for example, is broadly Malta-like in terms of 
population size, remoteness, and homogeneity. Wichita, which is located 
in almost the exact middle of the continental United States, in 2014 
reported a population of just over 388,413, about 30,000 people smaller 
than Malta. Also like Malta, Wichita has an age-diverse population.225 A 
glance at any map of the United States illustrates how Wichita, like Malta, 
is a geographically isolated major population center.226 One of Malta’s 
interesting characteristics is its relative heterogeneity,227 close to 90% of 
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Wichita’s adult population is at least high school educated,228 and a 
majority of Wichita self-identifies as religious.229  
Wichita jury practices do not conform or adapt to Wichita’s size, 
isolation, and homogeneity. In Kansas, jury selection on average consists 
of two hours of attorney questioning of prospective jurors,230 which 
concludes in the exercise of both peremptory strikes231 and strikes for 
cause.232 
Kansas juries are not interactive. In Kansas, throughout the trial, the 
judge “may instruct the jury on such matters as in the judge’s opinion will 
assist the jury in considering the evidence as it is presented.”233 Kansas 
jurors were permitted to submit questions in writing to witnesses in less 
than 3% of trials.234 Juries are admonished throughout trial “not to [form] 
or express any opinion . . . until the case is finally submitted to them.”235 
Although no explicit Kansas constitutional or statutory provision requires 
a unanimous verdict, a unanimity requirement can be inferred from the 
statutes,236 is assumed by the Kansas Supreme Court,237 and is recognized 
by the Kansas appellate courts.238 
Wichita has no rules deviating from the practice across Kansas. 
Kansas felony trial jury practice is squarely within the norm of American 
practice. In particular, within the aspects of practice that this Article 
focuses upon—voir dire, jury interaction, and decisional rules—the 
practice in Kansas is quintessentially American. 
Therefore, Kansas in general, and Wichita in particular, serve as a 
useful control for this Article in two ways. First, Wichita rebuts the notion 
that due to size, homogeneity, and isolation, no useful point of comparison 
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exists between Malta and the United States. Wichita is a rough American 
equivalent to Malta on these metrics, and yet still has American jury 
practices. Second, Wichita rebuts the related concern that America’s size 
is an impediment to adopting a Maltese approach. America is comprised 
of many small places like Wichita, and those places do not, but certainly 
could, bend their procedures towards a more regionally-tailored jury 
practice. 
A stark substantive difference between jury practice in Malta and jury 
practice in the United States is that Malta has no civil juries,239 but several 
rebuttals can be made in response to those who believe that this difference 
in jury practice makes Malta an impractical comparison for American jury 
reforms. First, most of the courtroom experimental data in the United 
States comes from civil trials, so in this regard perhaps Malta is even more 
important in filling data gaps in the American experience because Malta 
provides a data set from criminal trials. Second, virtually none of the world 
other than the United States has civil juries,240 so this difference would 
discount any foreign nation’s experience for comparative law purposes. 
Third, the premise of this Article, as well as essentially all American jury 
reform literature, is that juries are important. If so, then it may be of limited 
concern that Malta opts to not empanel juries in a less consequential set of 
cases than criminal trials. Finally, the suggestion of this Article is not that 
America should bow to Maltese practice, but rather that America should 
acknowledge and take account of Maltese practice. Thus, unless the 
absence of civil juries in Malta rises to the level of justifying totally 
discounting the Maltese experience, the lack of civil jury trials is not a fatal 
flaw to the comparison. 
One might posit that, although Maltese procedures are relevant to 
small American jurisdictions, Maltese jury practices are inapplicable to 
large American jurisdictions. Much larger justice systems than Malta, 
notably Great Britain241 and Canada,242 have no jury selection. These 
systems are not dependent upon the premise of “in this community 
everyone already knows everyone,” and yet they have no pervasive 
concern about the composition of jury panels. Notably, none of the 
empirical work cited in this Article on the utility, or lack thereof, of voir 
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dire is focused on the size of the community or on any other demographic 
aspect of the community.243 
The same is true of the work analyzing the desirability of a more active 
and interactive jury. None of the work is grounded in the assumption of a 
small, isolated, homogeneous trial venue.244 For example, the current 
experiment on allowing jury questions in American courts is occurring in 
populous major urban areas such as Phoenix, Arizona.245 
Finally, including the verdict option of “not proven” to deal with 
potential family and friend disapproval of jury verdicts mimics the 
Scottish approach.246 And through that or any other method, the concern 
is not limited to small, insular places because everyone, from a resident of 
Manhattan to a family farmer, has people they return home to after jury 
service, and about whose reactions they may care. 
CONCLUSION 
Perfection is a noble goal but never a realistic achievement. The 
American experience with juries will always be a work in progress. The 
research and reflection and reform of that experience has been extensive. 
Jury reform is not a purely academic inquiry. As of 2007, at least 38 states 
had formal and recent commissions or task forces to examine jury 
operations and trial procedures.247  
Yet Malta serves as a useful exposure of aspects of American practice 
that still need consideration and reconsideration. Malta’s experience 
suggests that the United States should reconsider the value of peremptory 
strikes, and independently consider the value of voir dire. It also suggests 
that allowing jurors to ask questions of witnesses carries little risk, and 
indeed these should be oral questions by jurors directly to witnesses. 
Finally, Malta’s experience shows that the United States should not fear 
active juror deliberation during all stages of the trial, and highlights a 
concern little considered in the American literature—juror anxiety over 
the reaction of a juror’s family and friends to a verdict. Even if Malta 
serves no more function than as a nudge to the United States to think 
differently, comparison of the Maltese experience to the American 
experience is useful. 
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